Child militarisation in pro-Russian media of Ukraine’s TOT

Russia is trying not just to maintain military and administrative control over Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories (TOT), but also to shape the generation growing up under occupation in a way that binds it to Russia. Children and teenagers have become a key target of this policy.

Russian education programmes, youth organisations, militarised patriotic upbringing, sports and cultural events, trips to Russia, and meetings with servicemembers all work together. Young people from Ukraine’s occupied territories are offered not merely Russian symbolism or a set of political narratives, but an entire life script wherein education, career, community work, and social success are tied first and foremost to Russia.

Media outlets in the occupied territories help desensitise people to this script – not just through overt peddling of certain talking points. What matters far more is that dozens of individual bits of content add up to form a single picture of normal life.

In this picture, a schoolchild joins the Young Army, teenagers help Russian veterans, servicemembers visit schools as moral role models, military training becomes part of the curriculum, and stories of the Second World War are used to explain the current war.

This is how the image of a socially approved young person — disciplined, loyal to Russia, and ready to “serve the Motherland” – is shaped.

Ukraine, in the meantime, disappears from this media space almost entirely. Ukrainian education, Ukrainian institutions, and the possibility of tying one’s future to Ukraine do not exist as an alternative. This is an important part of the Russian policy: identity is reshaped not just through what is actively promoted, but also through what is systematically erased.

Militarisation does not appear as a distinct campaign, either. It is woven into various areas of a child’s life: education, community work, historical memory, leisure, and the role model system. As a result, war no longer feels like an emergency and is increasingly presented as a natural part of life, growing up, and civic behaviour.

Why the Young Army needs the “good child” image

Shaping a positive, socially approved image of military associations for young people are a key vector of the youth-related work by the pro-occupation media.

A news piece by the news website DAN (Donetsk News Agency) showcases the pro-occupation media’s efforts to shape the image of Russian patriotic organisations. It is about activists with the regional Young Army branch helping veterans and people in need of support. A representative of the organisation describes the work as testament to the teenagers’ “great dedication to the cause of serving their Motherland.”

For context, the Young Army was founded in 2016, initiated by Russia’s Ministry of Defence, yet the media feature it not only as a patriotic organisation but also as an important component of social life in the region.

This is an important normalisation tool. The patriotic organisation enters children’s lives not only via drills, uniforms, or military rituals, but also through activities that appear, in and of themselves, to carry a positive social connotation, since they involve helping others, volunteering, and caring for veterans.

This expands the idea of “serving the Motherland”, which ceases to mean military service exclusively and turns into a universal marker of “correct” behaviour.

A news story about the “Victory March” project in Mariupol follows similar lines. Young Guard and Young Army cadets join with Russian servicemembers, representatives of the occupation structures, and a delegation from St Petersburg to tidy up WW2-era mass graves.

The story hinges on emotionally loaded phrases such as “remembrance is not just words: it is our actions,” “we remember,” and “we are proud.” The people buried in the graves there are referred to as “heroes who gave their lives for our future.”

Here, several notions come together: teenage activism, a military presence, remembrance of the dead, heroism, and the concept of the Motherland. Participation in a militarised youth organisation no longer appears as something special. It becomes a form of morally correct behaviour.

The language of such news stories is telling in itself. The occupied part of Donetsk oblast is referred to as “the Republic”, and the word “Motherland” is used as if its meaning were self-evident and needed no explanation. As far as the Young Army (a nation-level organisation), Russian servicemembers, and Russian state structures are concerned, “Motherland” is associated with Russia by default.

Media outlets don’t need to tell a child outright, every single time, “your Motherland is Russia.” It is far more effective to create a media environment wherein any other reading barely arises at all.

Military training in schools

Militarisation spills over directly into the education system, as well. IMI’s monitoring study found that media outlets in the temporarily occupied territories have reported on the Russian Ministry of Education’s move to expand the share of basic military training as part of the “Basics of Safety and Defending the Motherland” course starting from 1 September. Previously, this training accounted for around 20% of teaching time; the figure is now set to be raised to 50%.

At the same time, the military component doesn’t begin and end with teaching children practical skills. Idealised images of combat participants are also being integrated into school education.

Incidentally, Russian Education Minister Sergey Kravtsov announced on 25 June 2026 that starting the following school year, the Russian school curriculum would include a subject called “Russia’s Spiritual and Moral Culture”, with 83 “heroes” already selected for it, including participants in the “Special Military Operation”. These are to be featured in dedicated documentary films.

War, then, is entering schools along two paths. The first is practical: children are taught military skills. The second is values-based: participants in the war are presented as people whose life stories and conduct warrant emulation.

Schools will give children military training skills while teaching them who is worthy of being considered a hero.

One more thing matters for analysing pro-occupation media in the region. These outlets present the Russian Education Ministry’s move as ordinary news that concerns local children. Within this information space, the Russian education system no longer looks like the system of an occupying state — it simply becomes “our” school system.

Ukrainian education, meanwhile, is entirely absent as a possible alternative. Such news outlets therefore serve two functions at once, normalising the militarisation of schools and reinforcing the idea that the future of children in the occupied territories naturally belongs within Russia’s educational and political landscape.

The Russian soldier as a role model

The consistent media coverage of meetings between schoolchildren or students and serving Russian soliders and veterans is another prominent aspect of the effort to militarise young people in the occupied territories. In such news stories, servicemembers are portrayed not simply as participants in the war, but as carriers of a particular set of values: courage, self-sacrifice, camaraderie, and patriotism. Young audiences are, in effect, offered a specific role model, a kind of example to follow.

Tellingly, the organisers of such events speak openly about the educational function of these meetings. In June 2026, the Luhansk Information Centre (LIC) reported on an initiative by the Russian Znanie Society and the Motherland Defenders Foundation which involved participants in the “special military operation” meeting schoolchildren and students.

During such conversations, Russian servicemembers talk about their combat experiences, “commitment to duty and the country,” heroism, courage, mutual help, and “the feats of Russian soldiers.” Personal contact with servicemembers is even framed as a more effective educational tool than books or films. LIC cites Putin’s remark that “personal example is the best kind of upbringing.”

We see a similar mechanism in action in DAN news. For instance, DAN reported on a meeting between young people and members of the Somalia Battalion, timed to coincide with the birthday of Mykhailo “Givi” Tolstykh.

It opened with the screening of a documentary about his life and history in the army, with the servicemembers later speaking about “brotherhood in arms,” helping one another, and “the importance of defending the Motherland.” Tolstykh himself is described as “legendary,” a “talented commander,” and a “brave warrior,” with his “heroic deed” presented as an example for young generations.

The event closed in a particularly symbolic way, too: the children were gifted toy tanks, the explanation being that Tolstykh himself had supposedly loved playing with them as a child.

A positive image of military service is constructed in the meantime, and not only by way of overt heroisation of those participating in the current war. DAN also reported on activists with Molodaya Respublica and United Russia’s Young Guard greeting an airborne forces veteran, thanking him for his service. The news story referred to such veterans as “an example for today’s youth.” The media outlet described such meetings as a way of preserving “the ties between generations.”

At the same time, this picture effectively erases the other side of army experience: death, injury, mental trauma, disability, destruction, and the suffering of civilians. Young people are offered, for the most part, an idealised image of military service, stripped of any discussion of the real cost of war.

Using history to justify today’s war

Another ideological tool in the effort to influence young people in the occupied territories is appealing to historical memory. Pro-occupation media do not just try to popularise the Soviet pantheon of heroes — they attempt to build a symbolic continuity between the Second World War, Russia’s current war against Ukraine, and the young generation that is meant to inherit the value system offered to them.

A LIC piece on the Fiery Pictures of War campaign is telling example. In June 2026, young people in Luhansk arranged more than 1,200 candles into a picture titled “The Young Guardsmen’s Oath”, dedicating it to members of the underground organisation Young Guard, which emerged during the Second World War.

The organisers describe the composition as depicting “young heroes, filled with resolve and patriotism,” and its symbolism as embodying “the spirit of young people ready to defend their Motherland.”

The historical context LIC offers its audience is significant here, too. A substantial part of the piece is devoted to the Young Guard’s fight against the German occupation, the distribution of anti-Nazi leaflets, preparations for an armed uprising, and the torture and execution of its members. This paints an emotionally powerful image of young people in whom fighting the enemy and self-sacrifice are the ultimate manifestations of patriotism.

The news story itself draws no overt parallels with the current war. Yet within the broader context of Russian propaganda, which consistently frames the war against Ukraine through the rhetoric of “fighting Nazism,” the story of the Young Guard fits neatly into an already established system of symbols: the young people of the past fought the Nazis and defended the “Motherland”, and willingness to take up such defence is now being offered as a virtue to the present generation as well.

Another news story by LIC, reporting on the Serving the Motherland campaign, is far more direct in building this historical continuity. Kostyantyn Panchenko, participant in the war against Ukraine, met with students, speaking about the start of the Great Patriotic War before moving on to talk about present-day heroism and directly comparing Red Army servicemembers with the Russian troops of today.

He singled out the same virtues in both – selflessness, humanity, courage, and willingness to defend the Motherland – while describing the “inhumane acts” and “terrorist tactics” of the enemy of today’s Russian soldiers.

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For the young generation in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories, the current war is, in a way, symbolically woven into the memory of the Second World War, and Russian servicemembers are presented as heirs to the generation that defeated Nazism. This kind of propaganda aims to justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and to shape a particular framework of meaning.

The media landscape in the occupied territories builds a coherent system for young people, wherein patriotism is increasingly tied to military service, readiness to sacrifice oneself, and serving Russia. At the same time, propaganda makes use of emotionally potent patterns to enhance the perception of information presented in this specific way and interpreted along these specific lines. This is a reasonable method for raising a new generation that will normalise war and be ready to wage it.

The sample inlcuded five media outlets based in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories: DAN, LIC, dnrnews.ru, Mariupol 24, Donetskoye Vremya.