Russian propaganda responded to Mykhailo Drapatyi being appointed the new Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a coordinated smear campaign based on three key narratives: ridicule and dehumanization, false claims that Drapatyi is a “British intelligence agent”, and insisting that reshuffles in the Ukrainian army will not affect the course of the war, as evidenced by an Institute of Mass Information (IMI) study analysing the content posted by six Russian media outlets and ten pro-war Telegram channels from 20 through 25 July.
Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council, was the most aggressive in his rhetoric, resorting to obscene language and sexualised insults. His rhetoric was picked up and shared in meme format by Russia’s pro-war Telegram channels.
Another route the campaign took was promoting a conspiracy theory about Drapatyi’s alleged ties with British intelligence, the only “evidence” provided being a photo of Drapatyi being presented with a British military decoration — an official international award that Drapatyi received back in 2021.
The third narrative boiled down to “reshuffles will change nothing, Russia still holds the front line.” This message was promoted by Russian propaganda outlets as well as the Kremlin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov.
Yet, IMI experts note, this campaign was clearly self-contradictory. On the one hand, the propaganda machine claimed that Drapatyi’s appointment did not matter, all while involving high-ranking officials, leading state media, and the largest pro-war Telegram channels in an effort to discredit him.
If the event were as insignificant as they claimed, no one would have gone to such lengths, believes IMI analyst Olena Holub:
“Despite all the insistense that the change of commander ‘will change nothing’, the Kremlin has invested serious resources in the crisis management effort. Which is what suggests that the opposite is true: Moscow viewed the appointment of the new Commander-in-Chief as an event whose significance must be urgently underplayed,” says Olena Holub.
The study sample included six Russian news outlets and ten pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. The analysis was carried out from 20 through 25 July 2026.
